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Between Decisiveness and Credibility:  
Transforming the Securities Industry  
in Singapore and Thailand 
 
 
 
 
Abstract   This article suggests a political party-centred explanation of 
economic policy reforms that differs significantly from the standard theoretical 
models that emphasise social coalitions, government systems, regime types or 
electoral cycles. The explanatory approach advanced here focuses on inter-
party and intra-party organisational dimensions within an integrated analytical 
framework as the major determinants of both the decisiveness of policy 
reforms and the credibility of such reforms. A comparative analysis of 
government efforts to transform the securities industry in Singapore and 
Thailand provides preliminary evidence with which to explore the proposed 
causal linkage between the patterns of stock market reforms and the changing 
configurations of political parties.  
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In Singapore and Thailand, the past two decades have witnessed increasingly 
intensified efforts at reforming stock markets: to reduce restraints on new entry 
and remove oligopolistic practices in the securities industry; to privatise state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in order to enhance the breadth of stock trading; to 
improve legal frameworks for securities market regulation; and more generally, 
to foster greater market orientation in the traditionally bank-based financial 
system. Despite these similarities in terms of the timing and content of stock 
market reforms, the two countries have varied significantly along two policy 
dimensions: decisiveness or the ability of governments to initiate market 
reforms and credibility or the ability of governments to maintain given reforms 
and follow them through.1 
The Singapore government has been able to enact decisive and well-
planned market reforms, often in response to external economic shocks, market 
pressures and financial crises. Equally significant, a high degree of consistency 
has been manifest in the implementation of various liberalisation measures. In 
Thailand, by contrast, indecisive action and inordinate postponement invariably 
plagued stock market reforms. Even when external market and political 
pressures thrust markets reforms onto the government agenda, many of these 
reforms were considerably diluted or abandoned in midstream. The Thai 
government under Thaksin Shinawatra formulated more decisive reforms in the 
early 2000s, but the reform process continued to suffer from poor credibility. 
This article advances a political party-centred explanation of variations in 
the pattern of stock market reforms cross Singapore and Thailand and over time. 
Distinct from the standard theoretical models that emphasise social coalitions, 
government systems, regime types or electoral cycles,2 it argues that the policy 
impact of these political institutions is mediated through the characteristics of 
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political parties. More specifically, the article combines party system 
concentration and internal party unity or party cohesion and discipline in an 
integrated theoretical framework and underscores the varied ways in which 
these two variables interact to produce different policy patterns. Governments 
operating in concentrated party systems with unified parties tend to have 
greater capabilities to both initiate policy changes and implement these changes 
consistently. By contrast, fragmented party systems coupled with incohesive 
parties are more likely to discourage the initiation of decisive market reforms 
and undermine the resolute enactment of such reforms. 
Singapore and Thailand differ significantly in the degree of party system 
concentration and internal party strength. Singapore has a highly concentrated 
party system that exists alongside the centralised, cohesive and disciplined 
ruling party. These inter and intra-party dimensions have institutionalised the 
strong ability of politicians to initiate programmatic reforms and follow them 
through effectively. Prior to the late 1990s, Thailand had many poorly 
disciplined and highly decentralised parties within an enormously fragmented 
party system. These party dimensions rendered stock market reforms neither 
decisive nor resolute. The Thai party system became increasingly concentrated 
due to constitutional reforms in the late 1990s, but leading parties themselves 
remained internally weak. As a result, the reform process was more decisive 
but remained less credible. The military coup that toppled the Thaksin 
government in September 2006 made it difficult to observe how changes in the 
Thai party system would impact stock market reforms in the longer run.  
While there are systematic variations between Singapore and Thailand in 
the dependent and explanatory variables, the comparability of these two cases 
might be questioned. Four objections can be anticipated. First, Singapore is 
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much richer than Thailand in per capital terms. As theorised in a number of 
important studies (Graham, 1994; Haggard and Webb, 1994), governments 
with abundant financial resources can afford to compensate social groups 
adversely affected by reforms in order to soften their resistance. Although the 
Singapore government has used its public housing programme to boost its 
popularity, it is not evident that it has invoked compensatory schemes to make 
concessions to social groups that might lose out from market liberalisation. It is 
thus empirically difficult to associate variations in stock market reforms with 
different levels of economic development in Singapore and Thailand. 
Second, it can be argued that the more democratic system of Thailand has 
rendered policy-makers more susceptible to political demands and undermined 
the effectiveness of market reforms. Taking a different position, this article 
contends that the effects of varied regime types are mediated through the 
organisational structures of political parties. In less democratic polities, well-
organised parties and institutionalised party systems are likely to make 
politicians more capable to enact consistent and effective policies. In a more 
democratic system, decentralised and poorly institutionalised parties are likely 
to result in more indecisive policy action (Ho, 2003; Kuhonta, 2004). The 
claim is that successful reforms in Singapore is not so much a function of a 
more authoritarian polity as a function of a strong ruling party and party system 
whereas less effective reforms in Thailand result not from a more democratic 
system but from crippling deficiencies in the design of the party system. 
Third, cross-country variations in market reforms might have derived from 
differences in the policy-making capacities of economic officials in Singapore 
and Thailand. Comparative studies (Hamilton-Hart, 2002) have attributed the 
strong ability of Singapore financial technocrats to govern the financial sector 
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to their high capacities. Thai technocrats, who were widely regarded as 
paragons of competent and well-trained policy-makers in the developing world 
(Christensen et al., 1993), saw their policy-making capacity and autonomy 
decline in the 1990s. As documented in key empirical analyses (Pongsudhirak, 
2002; Zhang, 2005), this is a direct function of deficiencies in the political 
party structure that generated the strong incentive for politicians to intervene in 
the reform process in pursuit of private-regarding policies. The weaker ability 
of Thai financial officials to enact effective market reforms reflects ‘sins of 
commission’ or political interference rather than ‘sins of omission’ or the lack 
of adequate administrative capacities, as will be demonstrated below.    
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the systemic-centred proposition 
would posit that Singapore, which has a more open economy than Thailand, 
has been subject to greater external forces and thus under stronger pressures to 
liberalise its stock market. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson (2006) show 
that the annual average economic openness score was 9.1 (out of 10, the 
highest score) in Singapore over 1990-2004, as compared to 7.8 in Thailand in 
the same period. The proposition is plausible, but there remain theoretical and 
empirical problems.  
Theoretically, the systemic-centred argument suffers from an endogeneity 
problem: greater openness in Singapore may have stemmed from more decisive 
and consistent efforts to liberalise the financial market. Empirically, there are 
two key issues. First, relatively small cross-country differences in economic 
openness between the two countries do not appear to account fully for 
significant variations in the patterns of stock market reforms, casting doubts on 
the importance of economic openness as a major causal variable. Second, while 
Singapore allowed foreign banks to operate offshore businesses in the Asian 
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Dollar Market since the late 1960s, it separated the offshore market strictly 
from the domestic financial sector and restricted direct foreign entry into 
capital markets (Tan, 2005; Zhang, 2003). Equally important, the government 
had an extensive ownership of the economy, despite the country’s openness to 
trade and capital flows. With regard to key stock market reforms—entry 
deregulation and privatisation, Singapore did not have much head start over 
Thailand in the late 1980s when the two countries began to intensify their 
reform efforts; it would thus be hard to attribute Singapore’s more successful 
reform efforts to its earlier process of financial opening. 
It is thus clear from the above that the other primary causal factors—
economic development levels, regime types, bureaucratic quality and systemic 
forces—either do not fundamentally differentiate Singapore from Thailand or 
to the extent they do their impact tends to be mediated through cross-country 
differences in political party structures. Methodologically, the appeal of these 
two cases is that they lend themselves quite handily to the central analytical 
purpose of this article in seeking to highlight the effects of political parties on 
market reforms. They make it reasonable to control for the possible 
independent effects of these other factors during the period under consideration 
and to bring the policy impact of political parties to the foreground.  
The rest of the article is divided into four sections. The first section 
advances an explanatory approach that considers the policy impact of party 
system concentration in tandem with that of internal party unity. The second 
section differentiates Singapore and Thailand on the external and internal 
dimensions of political parties. The third section shows the proposed causal 
linkage between the characteristics of political parties and the trajectories of 
stock market changes in the two countries. The fourth and final section 
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explores the policy implications of empirical findings for financial reforms in 
emerging market countries. 
 
Sources of Decisiveness and Credibility 
In Singapore and Thailand, as in many other emerging market countries, 
external political and market forces have provided important stimuli to stock 
market reforms. These factors have converged on the on-going process of 
financial globalisation that has prompted emerging market countries to 
liberalise stock markets as an important strategy for attracting foreign capital 
and enhancing their international economic status. Equally significant, the neo-
liberal norms promoted by key international organisations have played a crucial 
role in promoting the liberalisation of capital markets. Particularly in the 
aftermath of financial crises, such as those that affected Latin America and East 
Asia in the 1990s, there have been political pressures from multilateral 
institutions for the accelerated liberalisation of regulatory barriers, privatisation 
of SOEs and improvement of securities market regulation.    
While external forces have been an important source of stock market 
reforms, the national patterns of these reforms have not been uniform, as 
evidenced in the cases of Singapore and Thailand. This suggests that domestic 
political structures are important in understanding these patterns. Stock market 
reforms, like any other economic reforms, have wide-ranging distributive 
consequences that reverberate across a broad array of social interests and 
political groups. While market reforms are expected to benefit the national 
economy in the long run, they are likely to harm the interests of some social 
groups and thus encounter political resistance. The resistance would be strong 
and effective where politicians respond positively to the protests of these 
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groups who stand to lose various advantages as a result of stock market reforms. 
This is more likely to be the case if particular political structures, such as 
fragmented party systems and incohesive parties, institutionalise strong 
incentives for politicians to use entry barriers, state ownership and loose 
regulations to carve out divisible benefits for narrow constituencies.  
The degree of party system concentration shapes the propensity of 
governments to respond positively to external stimuli and override domestic 
political obstacles and initiate stock market reforms. Concentrated systems with 
competition organised among a small number of large parties tend to prompt 
politicians to build broad coalitions of support (Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004; 
Cox, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). The reason is simple: parties in such 
systems need to secure majorities to win elections. In fragmented systems with 
a large number of small parties competing in elections, it is virtually impossible 
for any party to win majorities. This is likely to motivate politicians to mobilise 
particular segments of society for electoral support and move towards the 
formation of narrow coalitions. Any attempts by one party to build broad 
coalitions may risk creating opportunities for other parties to undercut its 
support base by appealing directly to specific social groups (Cox, 1997; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1999). 
This suggests that political parties in concentrated systems, which are 
forced to operate in encompassing coalitions, have to be accountable to broad 
constituencies and promote policy reforms that advance the collective interests 
of society. Politicians in fragmented party systems are keen to provide private-
regarding policies that are targeted to specific social groups in order to 
maintain the allegiance of their narrow constituencies. The argument here is not 
that there is no scope for private-reading policies in concentrated systems. 
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Political particularism is certainly possible where parties are captured by 
powerful private interests. Other things being equal, however, parties and 
governments they represent in concentrated party systems are more likely to 
provide public-regarding market reforms. 
Party system concentration not only inclines governments to pursue public-
regarding market reforms but also enables them to act on their policy incentives 
in a decisive manner. Concentrated systems that minimise the number of veto 
players and centralise policy-making authority strengthen the ability of state 
policy-makers to initiate policy reforms. On the other hand, fragmented 
systems that scatter veto authority among multiple actors representing 
heterogeneous interests impede decisive policy changes (Sartori, 1997; Schick, 
1993; Tsebelis, 2002). This is a well established argument and does not need 
rehearsing here. But it is important to emphasise that governments are more 
able to manage complex policy tasks, such as stock market reforms that are 
politically difficult, involve a wide range of actors and require multi-stage 
implementation, when they have centralised policy-making apparatuses.  
The ability to initiate policy changes may not lead to policy success, 
however; stock market reforms are unlikely to be implemented in a coherent 
manner if governments are unable to sustain such reforms. Important 
theoretical studies (Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002) have suggested 
that there are trade-offs between institutional capabilities generated by party 
concentration and fragmentation. While concentrated party systems that 
centralise veto authority are likely to undermine policy stability, fragmented 
systems that generate institutional barriers to policy changes reduce instability.  
This tension can be reduced if party system concentration is considered in 
close interaction with internal party unity. Party cohesion and discipline that 
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are engendered by party-centred electoral rules and strong party leaderships 
commit politicians to the label and policy position of their own parties that can 
help them to achieve electoral success. The importance of supporting party 
platforms encourages them to link their individual career prospects to the 
fortunes of their parties and subordinate their pursuits to party-determined 
purposes (Haggard, 1997; Nielson, 2003). In other words cohesive parties are 
more likely to align the policy interests of individual politicians to those of 
party leaders and provide strong incentives for individual politicians to claim 
credit as a party for the broad benefits that nationally oriented policies, such as 
stock market reforms, can deliver.  
Low party unity and fierce intra-party competition that are spawned by 
candidate-centred electoral rules, weak party leaderships and factional 
activities encourage politicians to cultivate personal reputation. They are keen 
to develop narrow bases of electoral support and to represent the interests of 
localized constituencies. As particularism dominates the electoral and 
legislative process politicians become indifferent and even opposed to the 
overarching policy platforms of their parties. For these reasons politicians are 
strongly inclined to press for divisible policy favours that can be tailored to 
particular beneficiaries and resist reforms that threaten to eliminate such 
favours (Cox and Thies, 1998; Nielson, 2003). This suggests that politicians 
who operate through incohesive and undisciplined parties have greater 
incentives to use entry restrictions, state ownership and regulatory intervention 
to target their specific constituents and supporters.    
Strong party unity not only inclines politicians to support stock market 
reforms but also facilitates the maintenance of such reforms. Empirical studies 
(Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997) have 
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related high party cohesion and discipline to the convergence of policy interests 
among party members and the limited number of actors involved in policy-
making processes. At a more theoretical level, George Tsebelis (2002) has 
argued that high degrees of party unity restrict deviation from agreed-on 
decisions and increase policy stability. Strong parties are more likely to sustain 
economic reform policies once party leaders have made commitments to such 
policies. Conversely, low degrees of party unity, which tend to multiply the 
number of actors and expand the diversity of interests within parties, are more 
likely to upset policy agreements and decrease policy stability.  
Furthermore, the literature emphasises the importance of cohesive parties in 
enabling party leaders to enforce programmatic discipline on their followers, 
maintain strong party label and pursue the policy objectives of the entire party. 
It is argued here that party unity not only empowers but also constrains party 
leaders. The personal goals of party leaders may set them apart from their 
parties. This is particularly the case where they have an interest in maintaining 
the loyalty of their constituents and use particularistic policy favours to that end. 
The party organization normally possesses mechanisms, such as selection and 
dismissal power, to control party leaders. But cohesive parties that can deliver 
the votes of their members of parliament act as a more powerful constraint on 
party leaders (Linz, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). The desire of party 
leaders to keep their parties unified in order to maintain parliamentary support 
prevents them from deviating significantly from the collective interests of 
parties while pursuing their own personal goals. 
Finally, governments composed of cohesive parties tend to be more durable 
and stable (Druckman, 1996; Lijphart, 1999). Government durability and 
stability enhance the ability of decision-makers to ensure that policies are 
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enacted as intended and that the policies themselves are sustained (Sartori, 
1997: 111-114; Warwick, 1994: 139-141). This is especially crucial for the 
successful implementation of capital market reforms that is typically contingent 
upon the stability and solidarity of policy-making elites. Equally important, 
government and policy stability allow private market agents to incorporate 
regulatory rules in their behaviour and make the objectives of reforms more 
likely to be fulfilled. Where major ruling parties are incohesive and fluid, 
governments tend to experience chronic instability. They are expected to be 
less able to develop the institutional cohesion and consistency necessary to 
follow through on implementing policy and regulatory reforms over time. 
The matrix in Table 1 displays the different combinations of inter-party and 
intra-party variables and their policy impacts. When concentrated party systems 
exist alongside unified parties (upper left quadrant), governments are expected 
to display strong capabilities both to initiate nationally-oriented policy reforms 
and to sustain such reforms, as in Taiwan before the late 1990s and Singapore. 
High degrees of internal cohesion within the majority party generate such 
powerful stabilizing effects that they can overcome the problems of policy 
irresoluteness associated with centralized veto power. Where party systems are 
fragmented and parties themselves are highly disorganized and undisciplined 
(lower right quadrant), politicians are strongly inclined to seek particularistic 
policies, as in Thailand prior to the late 1990s and the Philippines. Policy 
processes suffer from indecisiveness that stems from dispersed veto authority 
and instability that flows from party incohesion and indiscipline. 
In the case of fragmented party systems co-existing with well-organized 
and unified parties (lower left quadrant), high degrees of internal cohesion 
enables party leaders to rein in the rank and file in line with the collective 
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interests of parties and restrain the propensity of politicians to seek private-
regarding goods. While multiple veto players in fragmented systems may 
subject policy processes to indecisiveness, the internal cohesion of these veto 
players reduces the number of actors involved in negotiations and enables them 
to work out stable agreements. Internal party unity thus increases the 
probability that policies, once hammered out among various parties, are likely 
to be implemented as intended. This largely corresponds to the policy patterns 
in Taiwan since the late 1990s.  
Where concentrated systems are married to incohesive and undisciplined 
parties (upper right quadrant), weak party leaders who confront a legislature 
full of atomized and wayward politicians are more constrained in their ability 
to provide nationally oriented policies. Candidate-centred rules, weak party 
leaderships or rampant factional activities generate such strong incentives to 
seek personal votes on the part of politicians that they likely counteract the 
tendency for parties in concentrated systems to provide public goods policies. 
Concentrated systems may be conducive to decisiveness but incohesive intra-
party structures are inimical to stability. While centralised veto power in 
Malaysia and Thailand under Thaksin may be a boon for decisiveness, internal 
party weaknesses undermine policy credibility.  
 
Different Party Configurations and Policy Patterns 
In terms of the degree of party system concentration, there have been salient 
differences both across Singapore and Thailand and over the past two decades. 
As displayed in Table 2, a comparison of the effective number of parties clearly 
shows that the party system of Singapore was much more concentrated than 
that of Thailand for much of the 1980s and 1990s.3 In Thailand, however, 
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constitutional reforms enacted in the late 1990s drastically reduced the number 
of political parties and significantly centralised the party system. 
The highly concentrated party system has rendered political power 
extremely centralised in Singapore. One-party rule by the People’s Action 
Party (PAP) that has been in power since independence has been a central 
defining feature of the Singapore polity. Given the unicameral legislature 
completely controlled by the PAP, the fragmented and powerless opposition 
and the largely passive presidency with limited powers, the ruling party has 
operated as a single veto player and faced very few constraints on its authority. 
This has provided the PAP government with the institutional resources to 
formulate policies decisively and effectively.  
In Thailand, the lower house of parliament carried veto authority and the 
upper house only had the power to delay legislation. However, the fragmented 
party system invariably produced multi-party coalition governments in the 
1980s and 1990s, diffusing veto authority and leading to highly decentralized 
policy-making structures (Hicken, 2002: 38-57). This changed in 2001-2006 
when the party system became so centralised that a single political party, 
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT), maintained a majority of the seats in 
parliament. Together with the enhanced leverage of the prime minister over 
coalition partners, an increasingly concentrated party system centralised veto 
power and increased policy decisiveness.     
Singapore and Thailand also differ with regard to internal party strength. In 
examining cross-country variations along this party dimension, this article 
relies upon several system and party-level variables—electoral rules, 
organisational complexity, party reputation and factionalism—that are 
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empirically shown to have significant causal effects on party cohesion and 
discipline (Carey, 2007; Janda and Coleman, 1998). 
Prior to 1988, Singapore operated with the electoral system of single-
member districts with plurality voting. Strongly encouraging campaigns on the 
basis of party affiliation, this party-centred system committed politicians to 
party platforms that were instrumental in assisting them to achieve electoral 
success. Singapore has since combined a handful of single-member districts 
with Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), each with three to six seats. 
GRCs can only be contested by teams of candidates from the same party; 
voters cast a single vote for a team rather than for individual candidates. This 
has minimised inter-candidate rivalries, typical of the multi-member electoral 
system, that may have weakened party unity. 
The strong effects of party-centred electoral rules on party unity in 
Singapore have been reinforced by the highly centralised manner in which 
party finances are managed and the extremely careful and rigorous process 
through which candidates are selected. This high degree of controls over party 
finances and candidate selection has been particularly manifest in the PAP. 
Such controls have not only allowed the most able to rise to the top but also 
enabled party leaders to screen out those who may deviate from party platforms 
and encouraged the allegiance of individual politicians to the PAP (Mauzy and 
Milne, 2002: 48-49; Ooi, 1998: 371-374). 
Effective controls within the PAP have primarily stemmed from an 
organisationally cohesive party apparatus, characterised by strong leadership, 
centralised decision-making and the cadre system that plays the crucial role in 
the election of the Central Executive Committee, the epicentre of power within 
the party (Chan, 1985). This has not only shifted politics to the national level 
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and weakened the influence of particularistic interests on policy processes but 
also greatly enhanced the ability of PAP leaders to mobilise the efforts of 
members and supporters in executing its policies. 
Party-centred electoral rules and strong party controls have rendered PAP 
politicians highly concerned with party labels and reputations. They have 
demonstrated long-term loyalty to the party; party switching, while not 
uncommon among the opposition parties, has rarely happened within the PAP 
(Ooi, 1998). Party controls have been so tight and decision-making processes 
so centralised that factional activities have been virtually absent within the PAP 
since the early 1960s.4 While the internationalisation of state capital may have 
generated diverse interests within the Singapore state (Rodan, 2006), the ruling 
party itself has remained unified (Ooi, 1998).5 
The Thai electoral system had featured multi-seat and multi-vote plurality 
prior to the 2001 parliamentary elections. The system, which usually pitted 
members of the same party against each other, placed a premium on the ability 
of individual politicians to develop personalized electoral strategies that 
differentiated themselves from their co-partisans and build narrow constituent 
bases of support (Hicken, 2002: 38-57; Siamwalla and MacIntyre, 2001). 
Thailand’s candidate-centred incentives thus created significant scope to press 
for particularistic policies at the expense of the collective interests of parties, 
undermining party cohesion and discipline. 
Several provisions of the 1997 constitution, which introduced single-
member districts and, more importantly, a national party list tier, encouraged 
candidates to move to more party-oriented strategies (Hicken, 2006; Ockey, 
2003). However, the new electoral system’s incentives for Thai politicians to 
develop a national policy orientation were counteracted by three old 
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institutional patterns. First, while the campaign for party list seats became 
increasingly party-centred, contests in the 400 single-member districts 
remained largely candidate-centred affairs, predisposing politicians to cultivate 
narrow support networks (Hicken, 2006). 
Second, major parties and the TRT in particular remained heavily imbued 
with internal conflicts. No sooner had the TRT come to power in early 2001 
than its dozen factions began to struggle over party executive positions, cabinet 
portfolios and legislative posts. More significant, the rival factions of the TRT 
ran against each other in local elections and distinguished themselves by 
different campaign colours and party labels (Nelson, 2005a; Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 2004: 191-5). Intra-party rivalries continued to encourage politicians to 
develop personalised strategies that centred on the delivery of benefits to 
specific supporters. Such strategies were important in strengthening the weight 
of competing factions against each other within the party. 
Third, Thaksin achieved electoral success in large part by convincing many 
political factions and provincial politicians with existing local electoral 
networks to run under the TRT banner. While his formidable financial 
resources increased the power of the party over provincial politicians who 
comprised most faction leaders, Thaksin failed to break the link between 
factions and their voters (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 70-112). Provincial 
barons went to great lengths to reinforce their personal electoral networks in 
order to strengthen their power position vis-à-vis that of rival factions within 
the TRT and enhance their chances in local and general elections. They were 
thus under intense pressures to direct resources to their local constituents, 
despite an increasingly concentrated party system.  
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In Thailand, party leaders typically exercise weak controls over candidate 
nominations. Decisions about the selection of candidates are often made by 
factional leaders and regional administrative committees; strong candidates 
often nominate themselves into the parties of their choice. Equally, meagre 
funds from parties force candidates to raise their own campaign money and rely 
upon outside sources (Hicken, 2002: 54; Limmanee, 1998). Party funding is 
often a function of the assets of party leaders, as clearly evidenced in Thaksin’s 
enormous financial contributions to the operation of the TRT. These features 
have worked against the ability of party leaders to encouraged politicians to 
pursue personal policy interests. 
Most Thai parties have had shallow institutional bases, decentralised power 
structures and weak intra-party organisational procedures (Limmanee, 1998: 
421-424). As a result, party leaders have often lacked the institutional leverage 
to compel party officials and members to support their policies. At least prior to 
the late 1990s, candidate-centred rules and weak controls discouraged 
politicians from placing any value in party labels but encouraged them to 
switch parties frequently. Parties rose and fell quickly as politicians mainly saw 
parties as temporary alliances for competing for elections and had little interest 
in remaining loyal to their parties. 
Party switching seems to have declined, following the constitutional 
reforms of the late 1990s that required candidates to be members of a political 
party for at least 90 days to compete in elections and elections to be held within 
45 to 60 days once parliament was dissolved. As a result, would-be party 
switchers did not have enough time to meet the membership requirement and 
were forced to sit out one election. This enabled the prime minister to prevent 
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individuals and factions from bolting his party by credibly threatening to 
dissolve parliament and call new elections (Hicken, 2006; Ockey, 2003).   
Almost all Thai parties have featured long-established, institutionalized and 
multiple factions. Factions have had their distinct constituent bases of support 
and run their own candidates in elections, sometimes under their own labels 
(Chambers, 2005). While the party system became centralized in the early 
2000s, the TRT was so factionalized that it had more than 15 competing groups 
or cliques. The party acted as little more than an umbrella sheltering largely 
independent factions. While Thaksin managed to keep party factions largely 
loyal to the TRT during his first term, factional leaders became increasingly 
assertive in their demands for more ministerial positions and particularistic 
policies in his second term. This threatened TRT stability and weakened 
Thaksin’s ability to enact programmatic policies (BP, 29 March 2005: 6; 
EIUCR-Thailand, August 2005: 14; Nelson, 2005b).     
 
Transforming the Securities Industry  
The exercise of comparative statics undertaken in the previous section suggests 
a plausible correlation between the patterns of stock market reforms and the 
changing configurations of political parties in Singapore and Thailand. This 
section shows more convincingly the processes of the proposed causal linkages 
and compares these processes cross the two cases. 
 
Singapore 
The concentrated party system has generated such strong centralising forces 
that PAP leaders have been highly motivated to enact stock market reforms that 
promise to advance the interests of broad constituencies. This has been 
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reinforced by the cohesive structure of the PAP that institutionalises vigorous 
incentives for politicians to pursue a national-level reform agenda. While 
systemic market and political forces have provided important impetuses, these 
forces have acted on the reform process through the organisational structure of 
political parties that have made PAP elites eager to marshal support for 
transforming the securities industry. Financial technocrats in the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS), the country’s central bank and premier 
financial market regulator, are often portrayed as strong advocates of stock 
market reforms. For the most part, however, PAP leaders have led rather than 
followed technocrats in charting an overall and long-term reform strategy 
(Hamilton-Hart, 2002; Tan, 2005: 6-15). 
PAP leaders have been keen to push for stock market reforms with a view 
to fostering a more efficient financial system, expanding the scope of industrial 
financing and mobilising more resources for national development. Such policy 
interests have sustained the efforts of the government to liberalise the securities 
industry, divest state-owned enterprises and improve regulatory frameworks as 
an important way to nurture the growth of a robust capital market (Lall and Liu, 
1997; Lim, 1998). The strong desire of PAP leaders to achieve public-
regarding policy objectives through stock market reforms has rendered them 
willing to overcome political resistance to such reforms.  
Nowhere is this more manifest than in the determination of state 
policymakers to open up the securities market to greater foreign participation 
and abolish fixed brokerage fees in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, 
over the vociferous opposition from private financiers who stood to lose out 
from these liberalisation measures (BT, 5 August 1999: 36; 29 August 2000: 39; 
26 January 2001: 15; ST, 13 May 2000: 96). This is despite the fact that 
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policymakers relied increasingly upon market agents for policy inputs and 
prominent private financiers got directly involved in the formulation of market 
reforms (BT, 23 October 2002: 21; EIUCR-Singapore, 4th Quarter 1998: 20-21; 
ST, 9 December 1997: 56). 
Successful stock market reforms have required not only strong incentives to 
provide public-regarding policies but also sustained capabilities to implement 
the reform agenda. In Singapore, the concentrated system of government has 
greatly facilitated the ability of policymakers to take decisive action on market-
oriented regulatory changes. Equally significant, the strongly disciplined and 
highly cohesive PAP has furnished its leaders with the institutional resources 
with which to isolate financial and regulatory processes from diverse political 
demands and to rally party members and supporters behind their policy reforms. 
Given the dominant position of the PAP as a single veto player, its leaders have 
operated virtually without considerable institutional checks on their power to 
pursue market reforms in line with their policy interests. 
Centralised political authority has contributed enormously to the reputation 
of the Singapore government for quick responses to external and domestic 
pressures for stock market liberalisation at critical junctures. Over the period 
1986-1987, financial officials moved, with alacrity and efficacy, to craft new 
securities laws to tighten up market regulations and deregulate entry barriers 
and increase price competition to beef up efficiency, following the collapse of a 
major listed company and growing weaknesses in the stockbroking industry 
(FEER, 31 July 1986: 65-66). Market reforms were followed up intensely in 
the early 1990s when the government, in an attempt to compete against rival 
regional financial centres, significantly increased foreign presence in the stock 
market, despite the concerns and even opposition of local stockbrokers (BT, 17 
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December 1995: 1, 4; FEER, 2 April 1992: 78). The process culminated in the 
thorough liberalisation of the securities industry in less than two years after the 
Asian crisis, in the thick of the post-crisis economic turmoil that deterred such 
policy changes in many neighbouring countries. 
A similar degree of decisiveness has also been manifest in the process of 
privatising government-linked companies. The divestment of state assets in the 
stock market has explicitly been part and parcel of the overall plan to transform 
the securities industry (Low, 2006: 216-217). Privatisation, which often 
entangled many developing country governments in a web of political 
difficulties, was initiated in a rapid yet well-planned manner in the late 1980s 
and gained momentum in the early 1990s when the de-linking of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange from the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) 
depressed trading activities in the latter. While occasional resistance has arisen 
among civil servants and public sector employees, state elites have been able to 
overcome obstacles and push ahead with the privatisation process (Milne, 1991; 
ST, 14 January 1992: 24). 
Not only has the Singapore government enacted decisive and effective 
stock market reforms, it has been able to carry through such reforms. Strong 
interests in capital market development that have derived from external forces 
aside, the internal organisation of the PAP has crucially contributed towards 
policy credibility. In the first place, the high degree of party control and 
discipline has enabled PAP leaders to centralise decision-making processes 
within the party and align the behaviour of party members with the overall 
policy objectives of the party. On the other hand, the need of PAP leaders to 
rely upon internal party unity for maintaining majority support in parliament 
has prevented them from deviating from given party policies. Such need has 
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greatly increased since the 1980s when the opposition broke through the PAP’s 
monopoly of parliament and consistently posed challenges to the dominance of 
the ruling party in the electoral and legislative processes. 
Furthermore, the ability of the Singapore government to sustain stock 
market reforms has stemmed from cabinet durability and the stable core of 
financial officials in the MAS and the Finance Ministry. As shown in Table 3, 
the government has been much more stable in Singapore than in Thailand 
during the past two decades; politicians and technocrats who have headed the 
key financial agencies have had much longer tenures than their Thai 
counterparts. They have thus had sufficient time to obtain market information, 
develop technical expertise and create institutional resources to design market 
liberalisation plans. The stability of government and financial policy elites has 
provided the organisational cohesion and continuity necessary to follow 
through on implementing regulatory reforms. 
The stability of core state financial agencies has been, in the final analysis, 
built on the structure of the party system. The systemic political dominance and 
intra-party organisational strength have enabled PAP leaders to wield virtually 
unrestricted command over the economic bureaucracy and to mould the 
structure of state economic institutions in such a way that their policy 
objectives can be effectively achieved (Ho, 2003). Seeing stock market reform 
and growth both as an important objective in itself and as an indispensable 
instrument of promoting national economic development, PAP leaders have 
been willing to delegate enormous power to the MAS and the Finance ministry 
and established a cohesive and solid cohort of technocrats to lead the two key 
agencies. In order to create a clear and coherent sense of policy orientation, 
they have intervened to ensure the institutional solidarity between the two 
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agencies by orchestrating the exchange of top personnel between them and 
even fusing their leaderships (Zhang, 2003: 80-83).6 
The centralised system of government has helped to put in place the legal 
frameworks necessary to enact regulatory reforms. In Singapore, laws that 
authorise stock market reforms and give the process legitimacy have been high 
priorities for PAP leaders. Legislation that mandates new securities regulations, 
improves market infrastructures and enhances the regulatory power of the MAS 
has been invariably carried out in a decisive and timely manner. This is clearly 
demonstrated in the effective reforms of securities laws and corporate 
governance policies in the wake of the Asian crisis. These sustained efforts 
have put Singapore well ahead of many emerging market and OECD countries 
in the development of rigorous securities laws (Lopez-de-Silanes, 2004: 39). 
Likewise, Singapore has led its East Asian peers in the macro determinants of 
market and corporate governance that are crucial to the successful reform and 
sustained growth of the stock market (CLSA, various issues). 
More important than the timely and effective creation and revision of 
securities rules, however, has been the ability of financial regulators to enforce 
these rules strictly. They have acted harshly towards rule violators by levying 
heavy fines against them, revoking their licenses or even closing them down. 
These violators have ranged from well-connected domestic private financiers to 
powerful foreign stockbrokers and from transnational merchant banks to giant 
Chinese SOEs.7 As the Singapore government has significantly liberalised the 
securities industry since the Asian crisis, financial officials have upgraded and 
tightened securities laws (BT, 6 December 2006: 12; MAS, 2000: 43-45, 2004: 
29-30, 2006: 47-48). As in the past, they have shown little forbearance towards 
violators, both domestic and foreign. While the MAS has often been given 
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credit for effectively checking malfeasance and fraud in the securities market, 
its ability to do so derives from the strong ruling party and the authoritative 
executive that have been able to isolate MAS regulators from distributive 
demands. On many occasions, top PAP leaders intervened to protect the 
regulatory autonomy of the MAS when it faced strong political pressures to 
lower its standards, particularly from foreign nationals and firms. As a result, 
Singapore has been rated much stronger than not only most emerging markets 
but also many OECD countries on the indicators of securities rule enforcement 
(Lopez-de-Silanes, 2004). 
 
Thailand 
The policy preferences of Thai politicians towards stock market reforms 
directly reflected the incentives of the political party framework in which they 
operated. High degrees of party fragmentation, combined internal party 
disunity, strongly encouraged them to generate divisible political goods that 
could be used to build up and maintain their personal networks of support. 
During the democratic transition of the late 1980s and 1990s, perennial desires 
to deliver private-regarding policies to particular electorates for such purposes 
rendered politicians uninterested in capital market reforms that would facilitate 
financial development and provide general benefits to Thai society at large. To 
the extent that politicians did show interest in market reforms, they intended to 
capture such reforms as a vehicle for seeking rents. 
The 1980s also witnessed the growing strength in the political process of 
provincial politicians whose supporting factions and vote-canvassing structures 
were heavily regionally based. These politicians, who were backed by and 
beholden to local business interests, gained further ground over the 1990s 
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(Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002: 351-6). They largely dominated the successive 
governments, particularly under the premiership of Chatichai Choonhavan 
(1988-91), Banharn Silapa-archa (1995-96) and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1996-
97). Localised bases of support made them more concerned with promoting the 
interests of specific social groups but less interested in pursuing nationally 
oriented policy reforms. The ascendancy of provincial politicians reinforced the 
tendency of political particularism in the financial policy process. 
The political system was thus heavily geared towards pressing politicians 
and political parties to control and manipulate market reform processes for 
rent-seeking purposes. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s efforts to 
open up the securities industry to greater foreign participation and liberalise 
brokerage fees repeatedly encountered heavy resistance not only from stock 
brokers who had a stake in the regulatory barriers that kept the industry closed 
to competition but also from politicians who were keen to preserve regulatory 
favours for their cronies or had controlling interests in securities firms (Ariff 
and Khalid, 2000: 204-205; BP, 23 December 1999: 6; SEC, 2002: 74-79). The 
privatisation of SOEs, partly designed to reform the stock market, was halting 
and piecemeal. This reflected as much the desire of politicians to keep SOEs 
under their control as a source of political patronage and use board and 
management positions of SOEs to reward key constituents as labour opposition 
(Hicken, 2002: 234-246; Koomsup, 2003). 
Within the national government, stock market reforms lacked political 
champions willing to marshal the necessary political support for consistent and 
coherent efforts. The strongest advocates of such reforms were technocrats in 
the Bank of Thailand (BOT, the central bank) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). They were keen to reform the stock market with a view to 
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foster a more efficient financial system and mobilise more capital for industrial 
investment. 8  However, these technocrats had difficulty translating their 
preferences into policy outcomes, primarily because their authority and 
autonomy were radically devalued in the 1980s and 1990s (Zhang, 2005). 
While prime ministers frequently appointed technocrats to head the economic 
portfolios, they were still accountable to their political masters who lacked 
strong incentives to provide nationally oriented policies such as market 
liberalisation and privatisation. 
In the 1980s and 1990s unsuccessful efforts at stock market reforms 
certainly reflected the preferences and organisational resources of powerful 
financial and corporate interests in Thailand. As implied above, private 
financiers constantly lobbied for the protection of their regulatory privileges 
and resisted competitive pressures associated with market liberalisation; the 
strong opposition of SOE managers and employees frustrated government 
plans to divest state assets. However this is not a simple story of financial and 
regulatory policies being captured. Particularistic interests were able to assert 
themselves, primarily because the fragmented party system and internally weak 
parties that rendered politicians beholden to special socio-economic groups 
facilitated their access to the policy process and impeded the liberalisation of 
the securities sector. 
The foregoing analysis does not suggest that Thai policy-makers initiated 
no market reforms at all. Successive governments announced plans to push for 
such reforms. But Thai political institutions blunted the translation of these 
plans into programmatic policy actions that were necessary to ensure the 
effective transformation of the stock market. Prominent politicians, with large 
holdings of listed stocks or direct stakes in securities companies, had highly 
Page 27 of 40
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
28 
 
private pursuits in relation to market liberalisation. They were not so much 
concerned with long-term market development as with short-term measures to 
bolster share prices and rake in quick profits (Asiamoney, September 1996: 10-
13; BPER, June 2004: 18-20; Nation, 2 September 1990: 1). It is not surprising 
that when modest market reforms were introduced, they were much less 
coherent and consistent than similar reforms in Singapore. 
Even these reforms were subject to weak enactment. Prior to the early 
2000s, the large number of veto players in the cabinet made it difficult to enact 
regulatory changes that threatened to harm the interests of coalition partners or 
their constituents. From the late 1980s when stock market reforms arrived on 
the agenda the process was plagued by repeated delays. A good case in point 
rests with the tortuous move towards revamping the regulatory framework 
governing securities markets. The initial bills for market reforms was submitted 
to the cabinet for consideration in 1986 but languished in the Finance ministry 
for nearly six years. They were met with strong resistance from private bankers 
and their political allies in the cabinet who feared for greater competitive 
pressures brought about by stock market growth; senior members of large 
parties in the coalition, who were associated with securities firms, attempted to 
water down the bills that would subject these firms to stricter supervision (BP, 
25 October 1988: 5, 29 January 1990: 3; FEER, 18 April 1991: 69-70). 
The process of stock market reforms accelerated under the second Chuan 
Leekpai government (1997-2001) at the wake of the Asian crisis. During an 
initial honeymoon period when the crisis created a clear sense of national 
emergency and allowed Chuan’s Democratic Party to control the key economic 
portfolios, the new government was able to enact a series of economic reform 
measures. Included among these were financial restructuring and privatisation 
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masterplans that boded well for the reform of the securities industry. But as the 
worst of the crisis waned over 1999 the Chuan government found itself subject 
to familiar political barriers. Growing divisions within the coalition weakened 
legislative support for reform programmes and delayed financial restructuring 
and privatisation legislation (EIUCR-Thailand, 1st Quarter 1999: 15-6, 3rd 
Quarter 1999: 14, 1st Quarter 2000: 18; Nation, 9 April 2000: B1). 
Following the constitutional reforms of the late 1990s, the pattern of stock 
market changes began to depart from the pre-reform era. As the centralised 
party system forced TRT politicians to appeal to broader constituencies to 
allow the party to win votes nationwide, they focused more on party-linked and 
nationally oriented policies, such as financial market reforms and development. 
Equally important, the growing dominance of the TRT in the Thai polity 
enabled state elites to enact programmatic policies more decisively. This was 
particularly the case when the interests of top party leaders, specifically 
Thaksin, were engaged. The impact of these institutional changes was evident 
in the forceful resumption of the stalled privatisation programme, more 
determined efforts to create a more competitive securities industry and the 
launching of a capital market master plan that chartered a long-term market 
development strategy. 
Domestic political changes, as well as external shocks and market pressures, 
did thrust market reforms onto the policy agenda of the Thai government. 
However even these measures, which were neither as deep nor as broad as 
reforms in Singapore, faced the constant danger of reversal; political pressures 
continued to mount for the change and relaxation of policies and regulations 
that were designed to reform and promote the stock market. Institutional 
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obstacles, mainly derived from weak intra-party structures, contributed to 
implementation difficulty in several important ways. 
In the first place, factionalised parties made party leaders vulnerable to 
policy blackmail by powerful factions threatening to switch parties. With 
multiple factions in the largest parties that led the successive coalition 
governments, there was little prospect of the cabinet following through market 
reforms that hurt the interests of faction leaders and their key constituencies. 
To keep their parties together and maintain their dominant position within the 
coalition, prime ministers were often compelled to put on hold or scrap 
altogether agreed-on reform measures, even though they were in favour of 
these measures. This was manifest in the failure of the Chatichai, Banharn and 
Chavalit governments to implement tighter securities rules and brokerage 
liberalisation that they had intended to enact.  
Given the centralised party system during the Thaksin years, defection 
became less of a threat for party leaders. But the desire to please major factions 
within the TRT in order to maintain its dominant position often forced party 
leaders to backslide on pre-announced reforms. Opposition from powerful 
interest groups and prominent faction leaders, for instance, delayed and even 
blocked the plans to privatise SOEs and improve securities market regulation 
(BPER, June 2004: 12; EIUCR-Thailand, May 2001: 20, May 2004: 39; Nation, 
18 March 2004: 2). Similarly, entry barriers in the securities sector and broking 
fees were liberalised by fits and starts, mainly due to heavy resistance by 
private financiers and cabinet members with large stakes in securities firms (BP, 
7 January 2002: 3, 17 March 2004: 2, 14 November 2005: 7).  
Furthermore, internal party weaknesses contributed to unstable government. 
The frequent collapse of Thai governments in the democratic era rested as 
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much with intra-party infightings as with intra-coalition conflicts (Chambers, 
2005; Limmanee, 1998). While increased party concentration made the 
Thaksin government more stable, fierce competitions within the TRT led to 
cabinet volatility. Between early 2001 and late 2004, Thaksin reshuffled his 
cabinet twelve times. High degrees of instability denied party leaders the power 
to set up coherently-planned procedures to ensure satisfactory enactment of 
pro-market policies. Equally important, government and cabinet volatility was 
mirrored in a much higher turnover of financial policy elites in Thailand than in 
Singapore, as shown in Table 3. The low tenure inhibited the ability of key 
officials to develop the policy expertise and market information necessary to 
formulate and maintain a consistent set of priorities.  
Internal party weaknesses and associated intra-government rivalries often 
rendered prime ministers vulnerable to the problem of the lame duck. This 
weakened their ability to control the behaviour of the bureaucracy and left them 
politically powerless to resolve conflicts between the BOT, the Finance 
Ministry and the SEC. Such conflicts over a range of policy and regulatory 
issues intensified and persisted against a backdrop of the growing politicisation 
of policy processes in the 1990s (BP, 7 February 1997: 4, Nation, 9 April 2000: 
1; Zhang, 2005). Given that these agencies shared the responsibility for the 
overall management of financial policies, their conflicts made it difficult for the 
government to develop the institutional cohesion with which to pursue effective 
market reforms. 
Political barriers to consistent market reforms also contributed to the failure 
to establish an effective and efficient legal structure necessary to improve 
market operations. Laws promoting the sound and sustainable development of 
securities markets were a low priority for party politicians and thus the 
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necessary legislation was delayed. A bill allowing private limited companies to 
go public and inaugurating the SEC was on the back burner for six years; 
legislations on investment protection and bankruptcy were enacted erratically 
across the Chuan and Thaksin governments; legal frameworks governing 
financial market and corporate governance remained poorly developed by the 
time the coup overthrew the Thaksin government. 
Even existing laws were subject to political interference. Politicians, who 
had personal and political interests in the securities industry, had strong 
incentives to undermine the efforts of financial technocrats to strictly enforce 
market regulations that stood to harm those interests. From its inception in 
1992, the SEC was constantly susceptible to intense lobbying to limit its 
oversight of insider dealing and other fraudulent practices on the securities 
market (EIUCR-Thailand, May 2004: 38-9; Handley, 1997; Nation, 18 March 
2004: 2). The result is that the Thai legal framework regulating securities 
markets and corporate governance were limited in scope and weak in 
enforcement (CLSA, various issues; Lopez-de-Silanes, 2004).  
 
Conclusions and Implications            
Drawing upon theoretical studies on the policy impact of political parties, this 
article has sought to address the question of cross-sectional and cross-temporal 
differences in financial policy choices and stock market reforms in Singapore 
and Thailand. The empirical analysis is conducted on the basis of an 
explanatory approach that considers inter-party organisational dimensions in 
tandem with intra-party structural attributes. The findings clearly demonstrate 
that the patterns of market reforms have varied significantly across the two 
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cases and over time in response to the changing configurations of political 
parties. 
 While this article has attempted to show how the external and internal 
structures of political parties interact via the cases of stock market reforms in 
Singapore and Thailand, its analyses that suggest the importance of political 
institutions in general and political parties in particular in financial market 
development have more general implications for institutional transformation 
and governance in developing and emerging market countries. 
The prevailing IMF/World Bank paradigm for financial development has 
placed great store on getting the right institutional mix for the successful 
reform of capital markets and the smooth functioning of financial systems 
(IMF and World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2004). It has recognised that 
market-oriented reforms without strong institutions—credible legal systems, 
independent regulatory agencies and transparent policy structures—to facilitate 
such reforms are likely to fail. Institutions and institutional reforms are 
designed to foster market competition, enhance the spontaneous actions of 
private actors and ultimately improve the Pareto efficiency. These key 
constituents of the paradigm for financial market governance have quickly 
achieved the status of a new orthodoxy in the international policy community. 
While the new paradigm has provided a novel form of institutional 
rationality for market reforms and governance, it has been framed in narrow 
economic terms as the supply of legal and regulatory institutions. It has negated 
the role of political institutions, such as political parties, in financial market 
transformation in developing countries and neglects the process through which 
such institutions shape the preferences of politicians towards financial and 
regulatory policies and their capabilities to pursue these preferences. The 
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empirical findings of this article have established a new point of theoretical and 
policy departure for examining how politicians operating within different inter-
party and intra-party structures have shaped national financial architectures. 
They provide prime facie evidence of the close linkages between political 
parties, policy processes and market reforms. Only by addressing such linkages 
in broad political settings would it possible to develop a stronger intellectual 
basis for understanding the national patterns of financial policy choices and the 
political underpinnings of market reforms. 
  
                                                          
1
 Conceptually these two dimensions are discussed at length in Cox and 
McCubbins (2001). 
2
 For detailed reviews of these models, see Haggard (1997) and Nelson (1990). 
3
 The effective number of parliamentary parties is calculated by using the 
Laakso and Taagepera index that is N = 1/Σ ni 1= P
2
i , where P i is the percentage 
of vote of ith party squared. See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for a detailed 
discussion of the index. 
4
 The early years of the PAP witnessed continuous conflicts between the 
moderates and the pro-Communists that eventually led to the party split in 1961 
and the formation of the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) by the pro-
Communists (Bellows, 1970: 32-51). 
5
 In this sense, Ross Worthington’s proposition (2003: 220-250) that emerging 
diverse interests within the state have indicated the growing factionalism of the 
PAP is partial at best and misleading at worst. 
6
 Between 1985 and 1997, for instance, the MAS chairman, Richard Hu, was 
concurrently at the helm of the Finance Ministry. 
7
 Detailed discussions of these cases cannot be accommodated here. But for the 
background see BT (10 January 1991: 3), EIUCR-Singapore (3rd Quarter 1996: 
20-21, September 2005: 28, March 2006: 24), FEER (9 January 1992: 42-43), 
and ST (5 January 1991: 36, 7 August 1993: 48, 18 October 2002: A22). 
8
 Author interviews with a senior director of the Management Assistance 
Department of the BOT, Bangkok, 11 August 2005, and with an assistant 
governor of the BOT, Bangkok, 15 August 2005. 
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Table 1   The sources of decisiveness and credibility 
Internal party strength  
Strong  Weak 
 
High  
Singapore 
(Taiwan, prior to late 
1990s) 
Thailand (since early 
2000s) 
(Malaysia) 
 
 
Party system 
concentration 
 
Low  
(Taiwan, since late 
1990s) 
Thailand (prior to late 
1990s) 
(The Philippines) 
 
 
 
Table 2   The effective number of parliamentary parties  
Singapore  Thailand 
1980 
1984 
1988 
1991 
1997 
2001 
2006 
All years 
1.0 
1.1 
1.0 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1983 
1986 
1988 
September 1992 
1995 
1996 
2001 
2005 
All years 
5.6 
6.1 
7.8 
6.1 
6.2 
4.3 
3.1 
1.7 
5.1 
Sources: Author calculations, based on data provided in EIUCR-Singapore 
(various issues), EIUCR-Thailand (various issues), Nelson (2001) and Rieger 
(2001).  
 
 
 
Table 3   The stability of government and financial policy-makers       
 Singapore Thailand  
Average cabinet duration (in 
months) 
46.0 
(09/1978-12/2001) 
18.0 
(05/1978-03/2001) 
Average turnover (per year) 
   Central bank governor 
   Finance minister 
   Securities commission head a 
 
0.16 (1980-2004) 
0.16 (1983-2007) 
0.16 (1980-2004) 
 
0.35 (1985-2004) 
0.85 (1985-2004) 
0.42 (1993-2004) 
Sources: Author calculations, based on data provided in Croissant (2002), 
EIUCR-Singapore (various issues), and EIUCR-Thailand (various issues). 
Note: a This refers to the MAS chairman in Singapore and the secretary general 
of the SEC in Thailand. 
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